IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.
PART III.

IV. AMfENABILITY TO SUIT IN THE CoMmoN NAME.*This question is obviously connected closely with the problem last discussed.1 The difference is that where the associates are suing the question is whether their irregular organization is fatal to the privilege claimed. Where they
are being sued the question is whether they may set up the
irregularity in their own defence. As the decisions show
that the associates may exercise the privilege in the former
case, it is natural to find that in the latter case the authorities discountenance the defence. Sometimes the contract
theory is invoked. More often it is said that the associates
are "estopped." 2 "Objections like these are certainly not
to be favored when made by a company holding themselves out as a corporation and contracting liabilities as
such." 3 Sometimes the question is discussed as if the problem concerned the burden of proof. In such cases it is said
that "it is not incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that the
defendants have complied with the requisitions of the statutes. ..

. The existence of a corporation, and, of course,

its organization, may be proved by reputation, and by its
actual use, for a length of time, of the powers and privileges
of a corporation." 4 In this branch of the subject, as in
others, the case which strains conventional explanations to
the breaking point is the case in which associates are sued
in the common name for a tort. An important case of this
class is the decision of the House of Lords in Taff Vale Ry.
* The two preceding articles in this series have discussed the effect of
irregular corporate organization upon (I) the liability of the associates ;
fII) their right to act in the common name; and (III) their right to sue
in the common name.
' To wit, the right of associates irregularly organized to sue in the

common name.
' See, for example, Collender v. Painesville, etc., R. R. Co., 11 Ohio
St. s16 (,86).
Dewey, J., in Dooley v. Cheshire Glass Co., i5 Gray, 494 (zS6o).
'Shaw, C. J., in NarragansettBk. v. Atlantic Silk Co., 3 Mete. 287

(184).
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Co. v. Amalgamated Soc. of Ry. Servants.5 The railway had obtained from Farwell, J., an injunction
against the Servants to restrain them and their agents
from watchinig and besetting the plaintiffs' works and
from persuading or endeavoring to persuade persons under
contract with the plaintiffs to leave their employ. The injunction was granted on a summons directed against the
Servants in their common name. To this name the Servants
had acquired an exclusive right by registration under the
Trades Union Acts. These acts confer the privilege of holding property in the common name but do not expressly confer the right to sue or to be sued therein. On appeal from
the refusal of a motion to strike out the name of the Servants from the injunction order, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of Farwell, J., and their judgment was
in turn reversed on appeal by the House of Lords. All the
judges in all the courts, without, apparently, any clear idea
of what a corporation is, were of opinion that the trades
union in question was not made a corporation by the acts
of Parliament. Farwell, J., and some of the judges in the
House of Lords thought that the intention of Parliament
to make the Servants amenable to suit in the common name
was a fair inference from the provisions of the acts. Lord
Halsbury regarded the implication of liability to suit as a
consequence of the privileges conferred upon the Sertant
by the acts. Lord Brompton thought that "a legal entity
was created under the Trades Union Act of 1871 by the
registration of the society in its present name in the manner
.prescribed, and that the legal entity so created, though perhaps not in the strict sense a corporation, is nevertheless a
newly created corporate body, created by statute, distinct
from the unincorporated trade union, consisting of many
thousands of separate individuals, which no longer exists
under any other name." 6 Lord Lindley's opinion contains
a useful contribution to the discussion. He observe- that
:85 L. T. 147 (19o).
'This passage is a good illustration of the cornmon confusion of
thought involved in treating the existence of the so-called entity as a
basis of inference that a given right exists. In point of fact, it is the
existence of the right that gives rise to the conception of the entity.
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the ePquity principle which permits some of a class to be sued
as representatives of all forbids the restriction of the rue
" to cases for which an exact precedent can be found in the
reports." "The principle is as applicable to new cases as
to old and ought to be applied to the exigencies of modem
life as occasion requires." "I have myself no doubt whatever that if the trade union could not be sued in this case
in its registered name, some of its members (viz., its executive committee) could be sued on behalf of themselves and
the other members of the society and an injunction and
judgment for damages could be obtained in a proper case
in an action so framed." He then gives his reasons for
thinking that Parliament intended to subject the Servants
to suit in their registered name.
The ostensible .ground of this decision is, as has been
sten, an implication of a grant by Parliament of the right
to sue the associates in the common name. The real explanation, it is submitted, is the inconvenience and failure
of justice which would result from any other conclusion.
Lord Lindley frankly says that, in the absence of any statute, a suit should be sustained if brought against the Servants representatively. To recognize the right to obtain
relief against all where some only are joined, differs little
from a recognition of the princ:ple that a summons in the
common name served on a representative is a command to
all the associates to appear. When the appearance is finally
entered, it is an appearance by counsel on behalf of alL The
fact that compels the recognition of the right is the fact that
the Servants have actually associated themselves as a large
group organized on representative principles and are acting
in corporate form. They are in fact incorporated and must
be treated accordingly. It will, of course, be observed that
the case under discussion involves no question of irregular
organization. It is, however, the case of incorporation without statutory authority.
V.

CONVEYING AND RECEIVING TITLE TO PROPERTY.-

Unless the situation is complicated by the existence of a
recording system there seems to be no reason why co-owners
of property should not give and receive conveyances in the
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common name by which they have elected to be known. The
document which evidences the transaction will contain the
common name as the designation either of the grantors
or grantees. If the associates are the grantors, a representative must act on their behalf in executing the document
of title and in making delivery of it. The right thus to
make use of a common name is a right which ought perhaps
to be regulated by statute in the interest of public convenience, but if associates claim the right and actually exercise it, legal effect should be given to the action which they
take. The clearest case for the application of this proposition is the case in which the question respecting the effect
of the conveyance arises as between the associates and their
grantee. Neither the associates nor their grantee should
be permitted to repudiate the conveyance or to act in a manner inconsistent with it. Substantially the same question
is presented where the attack on the conveyance is made
by one who is not a party to it. A conveyed land by deed
to persons associated under the common name of the X Co.
Thereafter the associates in the common name conveyed the
premises to B. A then brought an action against B to
recover possession of the land, averring .that the associates
were not validly incorporated at the time of the conveyance
to them in their common name. The court were of opinion
that A was estopped by his conveyance from disputing its
legal effect This is, of course, in effect to decide that the conveyance was valid. The court in the course of the opinion intimated that a different result wotild be reached if the associates had been incorporated under an unconstitutional law. It
is conceived, however, that this circumstancewould not really
be material except upon the fiction theory which assumes the
corporation to be a person created by state action. A logical application of the fiction theory necessitates the conclusion that if no corporation was ever created, there could have
been no valid conveyance because there was no grantee.
An application of this artificial reasoning was made in Fay
v. Noble.8 C and others undertook to attain incorporav. Studebaker, 1g Ind. 462 (i862).
£7 Cushing, x88 (85i).
'Snyder
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tion under a general law and C transferred real and
personal property to the associates in their common
name, receiving payment in shares of stock equal in
nunber to three-fourths of the whole number of shares.
C acted as the general agent of the associates and in that
capacity borrowed money from A, giving a note signed
in the common name and depositing certain personal property belonging to the associates as collateral security for the
debt. At this time the organization effected by the associates
was irregular, but subsequently they reorganized regularly
and conveyed all their property to B by way of mortgage,
and B under this mortgage took possession of the property
.- hich had been pledged to A. In replevin by A against B
it is clear that A was entitled to a favorable decision in
case it should be found as a fact that C had the requisite
authority to make the pledge. The conveyance of the property by C to the associates in their common name was a
valid transfer and the subsequent pledge of the common
property by C, if acting within the scope of his authority,
gave to A a right which was violated when B took pos-.
session under the later conveyance. In point of fact, there
was a verdict and judgment for B in the court below, but
upon writ of error the appellate court were of opinion that
there had been a mistrial and that the verdict should be set
aside and a new trial ordered. The result, therefore, was
satisfactory because the finding that C lacked authority to
make the pledge would appear to have been contrary to the
evidence. It is worth while, however, to examine the reasons which influenced the action of the trial judge and the
appellate court. The trial judge was of opinion that at
the time of the pledge to A there had been no valid incorporation. The associates, he thought, were not necessarily
partners, and it was a question for the jury to determine
what the agreement actually was under which they were
doing business. From a consideration of this agreement
the jury were to infer what was the scope of C's authority
to act for his associates and to determine whether or not
he had the right to pledge the common property to secure
the indebtednes to A. If the v;ew of the trial judge is open.

IRREGULAR ASSOCIATIONS.

to criticism at all, it is upon the ground that he ought to
have directed a verdict for A on the ground that C's authority to make the pledge should be determined by the court
from an inspection of the articles of association, minutes,
and other documents offered in evidence. The appellate
court, however, took an entirely different view. In the
opinion of Bigelow, J., if associates fail to attain valid incorporation they are not partners although they carry on
a manufacturing business for the sake of profit. If, therefore, the trial judge was correct in deciding that there was
no valid incorporation at the time of the pledge, there was
a total failure to create a corporation, since "corporations
are known and recognized legal entities with rights and
powers clearly defined and well understood and wholly distinct and different from those of individuals and co-partnerships." As there was no corporation, C had no principal;
for he had no authority to act on behalf of the individual
associates. If he had no principal, he was not an agent.
"If he purchased, he purchased for himself. In him only
did the property vest, and as against all but the vendors he
had the sole right to dispose of it to others." From this
it would follow that the pledge to A was valid, not because
C was making an authorized disposition of the common
property, but because he was dealing with his. own property.
It would be difficult to think of a 'more artificial method
of arriving at an obviously sound result.
A problem not essentially different from those that
have been discussed is presented wher a subsequent mortgagee undertakes to question the validity of a prior mortgage on the ground that the holders of the mortgage are not
validly incorporated. C mortgaged real estate to B, a corporation de facto, and subsequently mortgaged the same
property to A. A in a proceeding to foreclose his mortgage
contended that the prior mortgage to B was invalid by reason of irregularities in the organization of B. It could not
be said in such a case that A was estopped, nor was he a
party to any contract by which corporate rights of the
holders of the first mortgage were recognized. Since, however, the conveyance had actually been made to the associates
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in the common name there was no reason why effect should
not be given to it. The court accordingly declined to treat
the first mortgage as void and recognized the legality of
the conveyance to the associates in their common name by
making use of the familiar statement that its legality could
not be questicied collaterally. This, as has already been
so often pointed out, is the same thing as saying that legal
effect will be given to the act which has been done. "This
rule," said the court, "is not limited to cases where one
by confract admits corporate existence, but is a rule of general application." 9
As associates may by organizing themselves in corporate
form attain the right to make and receive conveyances in
the common name, it should follow that a conveyance actually made in the exercise of such right should not be
invalidated by a subsequent judgment of ouster pronounced
against the associates because of their unlicensed exercise
of corporate rights. Persons associated under the name of
X gave a mortgage to A. Subsequently they gave to B
and others associated in corporate form a deed purporting to convey to the grantees in their common name the
premises theretofore mortgaged to A. X subsequently made
various other conveyances of portions of the land in question. The mortgage to A was, however, not recorded by
A until after all the other conveyances which have been
mentioned. A then brought an action to foreclose the mortgage as against the grantees, mortgagees, and purchasers
who had acquired their rights prior to the recording of A's
mortgage. Among the defendants were B and associates
in their common name. During the pendency of the foreclosure suit quo warranto proceedings were instituted by
the attorney-general against B and associates and a decree
of ouster was rendered on the ground that they had never
attained legal incorporation. At the trial of the foreclosure proceedings the record of the quo warranto proceedings was -admitted in evidence and the court refused to allow
B and associates to prove that they had in fact attained
'Williams v. Kokomo B. and L. Ass'n, 89 Ind. 389 (I883).
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corporate organization. The judgment rendered in favor of
the plaintiff was reversed.1 0 in the course of a careful opinion by Owen, J., the following language occurs: "The
theory that a de facto corporation has no real existence, that
it is a mere phantom, to be invoked only by that rule of
estoppel which forbids a party who has dealt with a pretended corporation to deny its corporate existence, has no
foundation either in reason or authority. A de facto corporation is a reality. It has actually a substantial legal
existence. It is, as the term implies, a corporation."
It is submitted that the decision in Perutn v. Cleveland
was clearly correct and that the opinion is a substantial
recognition of the fact that corporate rights may be attained
by associates without state grant and that acts done in
the exercise of those rights will be accorded their ordinary
legal consequences. It is, of course, entirely consistent with
this view that the state should be free to discipline the associates for having exercised without license rights which it
is to the public interest to regulate and control.
VI. EFFECT OF IRREGULARITIES UPON THE RELATION OF

ASSOCIATES INTER SE.-Let it be supposed that associates
unite in organizing in corporate form but fail to comply
with one of the requirements of the general law. After the
business has been conducted for some time a dispute arises
between the associates respecting the management of the
concern and one of them files a bill against his associates
seeking to have the association declared a partnership and
to have a settlement of its affairs on partnership principles. The question is whether the complainant may thus
ignore the character of the organization which has been
effected and treat the group as if organized on a partnership
basis. On principle it should seem clear that the associates
have in fact become incorporated and that no one of them
is entitled to invoke any remedies except such as are available to corporate members.
The facts of the suppositious case just stated are substantially those of Bwshnell v. Consolidated Ice Machine
" Society Peruns v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 481 (1885).
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Co.11 In that case it appeared that subsequent to the
beginning of business and to the plaintiff's participation therein he had temporarily lost his reason and
thai his associates had caused his stock in the company to be
sold for non-payment of installments. After his restoration
to health plaintiff was excluded from all share or participation in the management of the business. To a bill filed
to have the association declared a partnership the defendants
demurred. The demurrer was sustained and on appeal the
decree was affirmed.1 2
SUMMARY.

The conclusion of the whole matter is submitted to be as
follows:
I. Two or more persons may without state license cause
action to be taken on their behalf in a common name or
action may be taken against them in that name. The question whether legal effect shall be given to such action is distinct from the question whether or not the associates are
liable, with or without limit, for the action so taken if legal
effect is given to it.
2. Whether or not the associates who thus attempt collective action without state license are incorporateddepends
first, upon whether they have so organized their group that
nothing but collective action by official representatives is
possible; and, second, upon whether full effect will be given
to an unlicensed representative organization wherever the
state it not a party to the proceeding. If either question is
answered in the negative, the associates are not incorporated.
n

138 Ill. 67 (x891).

'A question analogous to that just discussed is presented when one
of two associates seeks a partnership remedy against the other on the
ground that the acquisition of all the shares of stock by two persons
effects the dissolution of the corporation. In Russell v. McLellan, 14
Pick. 63 (833), the plaintiff in a partnership bill for an account contended that in framing a corporation law the legislature contemplated
the association of at least three persons to the end that disputed questions might be decided by a majority vote. The court was of opinion
that the corporation had not been dissolved. The associates were not,
therefore, "partners, joint tenants, or tenants in common" within the
meaning of a Massachusetts statute (St. 1823, c. 140) conferring equity
jurisdiction upon the court, md the bill was accordingly dismissed.
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3. Whether or not legal effect shall be given to the particular kind of collective action attempted in any given case
is a question which does not necessarily involve the inquiry
whether the associates are fully incorporated. The concession of legal validity to a single form of collective action
need not imply a similar concession as respects other forms,
4. The conception of limited liability as an incident of incorporation results from the development of the idea of
corporate personality; and this idea is, in turn, the consequence of completely eliminating individual action and
substituting collective action, To concede limited liability
to the members of an unlicensed group implies that all the
modes of collective action are likewise conceded. Such a
concession is, therefore, equivalent to an admission of the
possibility of incorporation by the private act of the associates.
5. As a corollary to (4) it follows that if incorporation
without license is recognized as legally effective, though
irregular, there need be no hesitation in according legal
validity to acts done in the common name by associates
irregularly organized, The same conclusion is applicable
as respects suing and being sued in the common name and
making and taking conveyances of property
George W!iarton Pepper.

